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Abstract This survey article considers the background to and major features of the behemoth 
2013 CRD IV/CRR regime which governs the prudential regulation and supervision of banks and 
investment firms in the EU. The CRD IV/CRR regime is in its infancy. Initial empirical 
assessments suggest, however, that while it is likely to strengthen bank stability, it may also 
contribute to a contraction in the funding capacity of the EU financial system. While the ultimate 
effects of CRD IV/CRR are unclear, it can reasonably be speculated that unintended and 
potentially prejudicial effects may arise. This article suggests that the extent to which CRD 
IV/CRR can be applied flexibly, amplified and corrected reasonably easily, and supervised in a 
manner which supports consistency of application across the EU as well as an appropriate level 
of national supervisory discretion, will therefore have a significant influence on the ability of the 
EU to mitigate the risk of these effects arising. 
                                                 
*
 Prof. Niamh Moloney, Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, 
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2 
After reviewing the background to and major features of CRD IV/CRR, the article considers the 
extent to which the harmonization model deployed under CRD IV/CRR, the EU’s regulatory 
capacity to amplify and correct CRD IV/CRR, and the supervisory governance arrangements 
which support CRD IV/CRR are likely to mitigate the risks of unintended and prejudicial effects. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A. Introduction 
 
This survey article
1
 considers and contextualizes the main features of the 2013 Capital 
Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).
2
 These 
two measures together form the backbone of the post-crisis prudential regulatory regime which 
applies to financial institutions - banks and investment firms - in the EU. 
The CRD IV/CRR regime is vast in scale (the CRR alone runs to over 500 Articles and is being 
amplified by a highly detailed set of delegated ‘level 2’ administrative EU rules); wide in scope, 
capturing a complex population of financial institutions; highly technical (the regime drills deep 
into the workings of the risk management and capital planning systems of financial institutions); 
and imposes a level of harmonization previously unparalleled in EU financial regulation. It is also 
                                                 
1
 This survey article is based on a report prepared for the 17 April 2015 European Community Studies 
Association/University of Salzburg/Vienna School of International Studies/Vienna University of Economics and 
Business Conference on ‘European Banking Union.’ It seeks to review the major features and implications of the 
CRD IV/CRR regime. I am grateful to participants in the conference for their valuable insights and to the journal’s 
referee for helpful comments. 
2
 Directive 2013/36/EU [2013] OJ L176/338 (Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV)) and Regulation EU No 
575/2013 [2013] OJ L176/1 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). 
3 
a relatively new regulatory regime. The bulk of its provisions have applied only since 2014 and 
some of its transitional arrangements extend to 2019. Its implications accordingly remain unclear. 
This discussion, which takes a legal and institutional perspective, is accordingly and necessarily 
selective.
3
 It outlines the major features of the CRD IV/CRR regime and speculates as to its 
major consequences - with respect to harmonization and the banking ‘single rule-book’ and also 
with respect to institutional matters and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). 
Section I considers the main features and the political economy of CRD IV/CRR. Section II maps 
its coverage. Section III considers the main implications of the regime and how it may have 
unintended effects. Sections IV, V, and VI consider whether the level of harmonization deployed, 
the regulatory capacity of the EU to calibrate and correct regulation, and the EU’s supervisory 
governance arrangements which support CRD IV/CRR are likely to mitigate the related risks and 
unintended effects of the new regime. Section VII concludes. 
 
B. CRD IV/CRR: Purpose and Main Features 
 
The CRD IV/CRR regime is a prudential regulation measure. Prudential regulation is concerned 
with the solvency of financial institutions and with the support of financial stability. Regulation 
of this type is designed to reduce, albeit not to eliminate, the risk of institution failure. It seeks to 
manage the risks which financial institutions assume and to internalize within such institutions 
the costs of these risks. It also seeks to contain the risks of intermediary failure, given the dangers 
which risk contagion poses to the financial system. Prudential regulation is accordingly primarily 
concerned with the imposition of operational, risk-focused requirements on financial institutions 
and with the supervision of such requirements. These operational requirements typically include 
internal controls and risk management requirements; incentive management rules, including with 
respect to governance and remuneration; and capital, liquidity, and leverage requirements. 
Capital requirements, for example, are designed to impose internal costs on the carrying of risks 
                                                 
3
 A considerable and often highly technical academic and policy literature considers the different elements of the 
CRD IV/CRR regime and their implications for the EU and global financial systems. For a range of different 
perspectives see, eg, Amorello, L, ‘Europe Goes ‘Countercyclical’: A Legal Assessment of the New Countercyclical 
Dimension of the CRR/CRD IV Package’ 16 European Business Organization Law Review (2016); Alexander, K, 
‘The Role of Capital in Supporting Bank Stability’, in Moloney, N, Ferran, E, and Payne, J (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP, 2015) 334; Avgouleas, E and Cullen, J, ‘Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ 
Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship’ 21 Columbia Journal of European Law 
(2015); and Enriques, L and Zetsche, D, ‘Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation under 
the New European Capital Requirement Directive’ 16 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2015) 211.  
4 
by intermediaries, to absorb the losses which an intermediary does not expect to make in the 
ordinary course of business, and to support orderly winding up in an insolvency. Reflecting these 
functions of prudential regulation, the CRD IV/CRR regime seeks to increase the level and 
quality of financial intermediary capital in order to improve the loss-absorbing capacity of 
intermediaries and to enhance their resilience to liquidity shocks; reduce pro-cyclicality and 
systemic risk within the financial system; and, by imposing internal costs on the taking of risks, 
remove (or at least reduce) the implicit ‘Too Big To Fail’ subsidy which applies to large financial 
institutions.
4
 
CRD IV/CRR is a creature of the financial crisis era. It is in large part designed to meet the EU’s 
commitment to implement the G20 crisis-era regulatory reform agenda and, in particular, to 
implement the Basel III Agreement reforms to bank capital, liquidity, and leverage requirements; 
these reforms formed the central pillar of the G20’s initial reform prescriptions.5 The CRD 
IV/CRR regime is accordingly based on the three ‘Pillars’ of the Basel III Agreement: Pillar 1 - 
capital requirements (including for credit, operational, and market risk), capital buffers, 
securitization requirements, clearing and over-the-counter (OTC) derivative-related requirements, 
large exposures requirements, liquidity and leverage requirements, and governance and system 
requirements; Pillar 2 – the internal assessment of capital adequacy by Basel III-scope 
institutions (the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process - ICAAP) and the subsequent 
supervisory review by the supervisory authorities of Basel III-scope institutions (the Supervisory 
Review and Evaluation Process – SREP); and Pillar 3 – market disclosures designed to support 
market oversight and discipline, and supervisory reporting.  
The CRD IV/CRR regime is accordingly a regulatory measure but it also has a market 
construction and market support function. It acts as the harmonized prudential regulation rule-
book which governs the EU’s internal banking and investment services market. Accordingly, it 
contains the authorization procedures and ‘passporting’ requirements which apply to banks in the 
EU. It also dovetails with the massive 2014 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
II/Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFID II/MiFIR)
6
 regime which applies to 
investment firms. 
                                                 
4
 As expressed by the Commission: Commission, Economic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda (2014) 
(SWD (2014) 158). 
5
 As set out in, eg, the initial Washington G20 reform agenda: Washington G20 Summit, November 2008, 
Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Action Plan to Implement Principles for 
Reform. 
6
 Directive 2014/65/EU [2014] OJ L173/349 and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 [2014] OJ 173/84. 
5 
Structurally, the CRD IV/CRR has highly prescriptive (CRR) and more discretionary (CRD IV) 
elements. The CRD IV regime, which, as a Directive, had to be implemented by the Member 
States, addresses the authorization and passporting process for banks (the procedures for 
investment firms are contained in MiFID II/MiFIR); the supervisory review process (SREP); and 
much of the governance regime which applies to financial institutions within the scope of CRD 
IV/CRR. The coverage of CRD IV, which applies to the more discretionary or flexible elements 
of the CRD IV/CRR regime, was shaped by a series of policy and political determinations over 
the related negotiations as to the appropriateness of some degree of national discretion and 
flexibility in certain areas of prudential regulation. For example, CRD IV contains the 
discretionary supervisory powers which allow national supervisory authorities (national 
competent authorities or NCAs) to impose on financial institutions additional requirements to 
those set out in the Basel III Pillar 1 rule-book. By contrast, the CRR element of the CRD 
IV/CRR regime takes the form of a Regulation and so is directly applicable in the Member 
States. It covers the Basel III Pillar 1 and 3 rule-books, as well as distinct EU rules. 
Institutionally, the CRD IV/CRR regime sits within a complex and multi-layered institutional 
eco-system. The European Banking Authority (EBA), the EU’s banking market agency - 
established in 2011 as part of the crisis-era reforms to EU financial system governance and 
conferred with quasi-rule-making and supervisory convergence powers
7
 - has emerged as a key 
influence on the development of the CRD IV/CRR regime. EBA has been conferred with a very 
large number of mandates under the ‘level 1’ CRD IV/CRR to propose Binding Technical 
Standards (BTSs) (a form of ‘level 2’ delegated administrative rule) which are adopted by the 
Commission and which amplify and clarify the CRD IV/CRR regime. EBA’s quasi rule-making 
powers also include the power to adopt soft Guidelines and Recommendations which apply 
through a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism (they are typically directed to the national supervisory 
authorities). These quasi-regulatory powers, in combination with EBA’s recent pro-activity in 
identifying flaws within CRD IV/CRR and in proposing remedial action to be taken by the co-
legislators at ‘level 1’ (section V below), have led to EBA becoming the de facto custodian of the 
vast CRD IV/CRR ‘single rule-book’ which is composed of the legislative CRD IV/CRR IV text 
but also of a vast array of administrative rules in the form of BTSs, other Commission 
                                                 
7
 See, eg, Capiello, S, ‘The EBA and Banking Union’ 16 European Business Organization Law Review (2015) 421 
and Ferran, E, The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority, ECGI Law Working Paper No 297/2015, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2634904. 
6 
administrative rules,
8
 and soft law. EBA’s ability to ensure the consistent application of CRD 
IV/CRR may, however, become compromised given the uncertain effects of the Banking 
Union/internal market chasm which now fragments the EU banking market and, in particular, the 
evolving role of the ECB as the dominant actor with Banking Union’s Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), as discussed further in section VI. 
 
C. Context: From Liberalization, to Regulation, to Support of Supervisory Centralization 
 
The CRD IV/CRR prudential regulation regime is a creature of the crisis era. But its roots extend 
far back into the early history of EU financial system regulation. In terms of legislation, these 
roots can be traced to the 1977 Banking Coordination Directive I (BCD I) which set out 
minimum standards, including authorization requirements, for banks (deposit-taking institutions) 
only.
9
 It was a basic framework measure - very different in style and substance to modern EU 
banking regulation. In particular, it did not harmonize at a sufficient level of detail to allow for 
mutual recognition of authorization. A step change, which reflected international developments, 
occurred with the 1989 Banking Coordination Directive II (BCD II) which implemented the 
Basel I Agreement
10
 and so imposed harmonized capital requirements on EU banks. With this 
enhancement of harmonization BCD II was also able to introduce the ‘banking passport’ which 
allowed banks to operate cross-border on the basis of a single home Member State authorization.  
The banking passport was available to a wide range of services carried out by deposit-taking 
institutions, including investment services. BCD II, and subsequent EU measures which 
addressed, for example, large exposure regulation and the application of the banking prudential 
regime to investment firms, were consolidated in 2000 within the Consolidated Banking 
Directive.
11
 The 2000 Directive was subsequently overtaken in 2006 by the Capital Requirements 
Directive I (CRD I),
12
 which implemented the Basel II Agreement, applying it to EU banks and 
investment firms. 
                                                 
8
 Two controversial elements of the Basel III regime – the Leverage Ratio and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio – are 
amplified under CRD IV/CRR by means of Commission administrative rules and not BTSs. Where an administrative 
rule does not take the form of a BTS, EBA provides Technical Advice to the Commission but does not propose the 
measure, and does not benefit from the procedural protections which apply to its proposals for BTSs. 
9
 Directive 77/78/EEC [1977] OJ L322/30. 
10
 Directive 89/646/EEC [1989] OJ L386/13. 
11
 Directive 2000/12/EC OJ [2000] L126/1. 
12
 Directive 2006/48/EC OJ [2006] L177/1 and Directive 2006/49/EC OJ [2006] L177/201. 
7 
The harmonized EU prudential regulation rule-book which applied at this point in the evolution 
of EU prudential regulation for financial institutions was primarily concerned with liberalization 
and with passporting. It was also porous. While the harmonized rule-book implemented the Basel 
Agreements, it contained numerous national discretions and derogations for Member States. 
Significant changes were to follow – both with respect to regulatory style and substance. The 
financial crisis, as is now well known, led to a paradigmatic change to EU financial system 
regulation. The previously dominant concern with market liberalization was trumped by a driving 
concern to protect the stability of the EU financial system. Similarly, the related concern to 
accommodate a degree of national regulatory flexibility, and the policy/political acceptance of a 
modicum of national regulatory divergence and competition - associated, at least to some extent, 
with the pre-crisis phase of EU financial system regulation -  took second place to the new 
imperative to construct a ‘single rule-book’.13 The financial crisis also, reflecting international 
developments and the work of the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board, led to a 
related change to the sophistication and intensity with which prudential and financial stability 
risks were addressed by the EU.
14
 
This review article will not rehearse the causes of the financial crisis, its impact on the EU 
financial system, and the regulatory prescriptions which followed.
15
 But with specific reference 
to the CRD IV/CRR regime, the emergence of distinct EU-specific problems with the 2006 CRD 
I regime, combined with a large-scale reconsideration at the global level of the Basel II 
Agreement on which the 2006 CRD I was based, led to a fundamental reshaping of the 2006 
CRD I regime and to its ultimate replacement by CRD IV/CRR. Initially, major reforms were 
made to CRD I by the CRD II (2009) and CRD III (2010). These measures were based on Basel 
Committee reforms as well as EU-specific reforms (notably with respect to executive 
remuneration and with respect to the supervision of cross-border EU banking groups).
16
 The 2009 
CRD II and 2010 CRD III reforms were then consolidated within and significantly refined by the 
                                                 
13
 See, eg, Moloney, N, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (OUP, 2014); Howarth, D and Quaglia, L 
‘Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks, and 
‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union’ 51 Journal of Common Market Studies (2013) 103; and Ferran, E, 
‘Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform: Where in the World is the EU Going?’ in Ferran, E, Moloney, N, Hill, J and 
Coffee, C, The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (CUP, 2012) 1. 
14
 For a consideration of the changes to how prudential regulation was designed, applied, and supervised globally 
over the crisis era see, eg, Avgouleas, E, The Governance of Global Financial Markets: the Law, the Governance, 
the Politics (CUP, 2012). 
15
 See the references at notes 13 and 14 above. 
16
 CRD II (2009) (Directive 2009/111/EC [2009] OJ L302/97) addressed, inter alia, securitizations and cross-border 
supervision. CRD III (2010) addressed, inter alia, re-securitizations, trading book capital requirements, and executive 
remuneration controls (Directive 2010/76/EU [2010] OJ L329/3). 
8 
massive 2013 CRD IV/CRR regime.
17
 CRD IV/CRR implements the Basel III Agreement as well 
as related earlier Basel Committee reforms.
18
 It also adopts EU-specific reforms. As discussed in 
section II below, the latter include the extensive new executive remuneration regime; the new 
firm governance rules; a number of transparency/reporting requirements; and the three additional 
capital buffers which the EU has adopted in addition to the Basel III Agreement buffers (the 
systemic risk buffer, the global systemic institution buffer, and the ‘other systemic institution’ 
buffer). 
With respect to its regulatory design, the harmonization achieved by CRD IV/CRR, regarded as a 
whole, is not technically in the form of ‘maximum harmonization’ which removes Member State 
discretion. But the level of harmonization which the regime achieves is extensive and intrusive 
across a number of dimensions. The CRD IV/CRR regime marks the first time elements of 
prudential regulation have applied on a fully harmonized basis in the EU, through the directly 
applicable CRR. The CRD IV/CRR regime is also amplified by a dense thicket of secondary 
‘level 2’ delegated administrative rules (primarily in the form of Binding Technical Standards but 
including also other administrative rules) and by an immense array of soft law, primarily in the 
form of Guidelines and Recommendations issued by EBA. As discussed in section VI, CRD 
IV/CRR also governs national supervisory practices (through the SREP requirements in 
particular); supports EBA’s myriad activities in support of pan-EU supervisory coordination and 
convergence; and is a core element of the rule-book which governs how the ECB/SSM engages 
in supervision within Banking Union. Although aspects of the CRD IV/CRR regime are still 
something of a work-in-progress,
19
 the adoption of the regime has been described by the Basel 
Committee as a ‘watershed event’, given the scale of harmonization it has brought to the EU 
market.
20
 
Given the importance of CRD IV/CRR, a short note on its political economy is warranted. 
Although CRD IV/CRR was the pathfinder for the EU’s financial crisis reform agenda, kicking 
                                                 
17
 The Commission’s Proposals were presented in July 2011 (COM (2011) 453 – CRD IV and COM (2011) 452 – 
CRR), the Parliament reached negotiating positions in May 2012 (A7-0170/2012 - CRD IV and A7-0171-2012 – 
CRR), and the Council adopted General Approaches in March 2013, following which trilogue negotiations 
concluded in April 2013. 
18
 In particular the 2010 Basel trading/market risk reforms (‘Basel 2.5’). 
19
 As at 18 February 2016, 26 of the 50 sets of level 2 Regulatory Technical Standards required to be adopted under 
CRD IV/CRR had completed the level 2 adoption process: Commission, Regulatory Technical Standards 
Supplementing Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD), State of Play, 18 February 
2016. 
20
 Basel Committee, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP), Assessment of Basel III Regulation – 
European Union, December 2014 (RCAP), 4. 
9 
off the massive programme of EU reforms, and despite its scale, its adoption was relatively 
uncontroversial. During the Basel III Agreement negotiations (which shaped CRD IV/CRR) the 
EU negotiated as a bloc on some issues where a common interest could be established, but the 
interests of the individual Member States who sit on the Basel Committee also shaped the Basel 
III Agreement.
21
 This imposition of EU preferences through two channels of influence reflects 
the significant structural differences which persist between Member States’ banking markets.22 
Subsequent EU implementation of the Basel III Agreement through the CRD IV/CRR 
negotiations was accordingly relatively uncontroversial - certainly as compared to the fraught 
parallel crisis-era negotiations on the 2011 Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive.
23
 
There were, however, some difficulties. The main points of contention included: the nature of the 
highly harmonized single rule-book model adopted, and the related prohibition on Member States 
from imposing higher capital requirements and being able to use capital as a competitive device; 
the extent and scale of the capital buffers (which extend beyond the Basel III Agreement 
requirements); and, most famously, the executive remuneration regime. While solutions were 
found, the negotiations had the effect of embedding national and EU calibrations and preferences 
to the potential detriment of the global consistency of the Basel III Agreement (section IV 
below). Overall, the CRD IV/CRR regime sits well with the characterization of EU financial 
system regulation as being shaped over the crisis by ‘market-shaping’ States rather than by 
‘market-making’ States. The crisis-era has seen the ‘market-shaping’ coalition of Member States, 
and their institutionally-shaped economic interests, come to the fore, as a more intrusive approach 
to regulation, and a more sceptical approach to market finance, has developed.
24
 CRD IV/CRR 
provides ample evidence of this development.  
 
                                                 
21
 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom all sit 
on the Basel Committee. For discussion of how individual Member State interests and collective EU interests were 
imposed (or not) on the Basel III Agreement see Quaglia, L, The European Union & Global Financial Regulation 
(OUP, 2014) 43-46 and Blom, J, ‘Banking’ in Mügge, D (ed), Europe and the Governance of Global Finance (OUP, 
2014) 35, 47-52. 
22
 For a recent discussion see Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Report 2014 (2015) (SWD 
(2015) 98) 62-72. 
23
 Directive 2011/61/EU [2011] OJ L174/1. See further Ferran, E, ‘After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds 
and Private Equity in the EU’ 12 European Business Organization Law Review (2011) 379. 
24
 See, in particular, the work by political economist Lucia Quaglia: eg, Quaglia, L, ‘The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political 
Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the EU’ (2011) 34 West European Politics 665. 
10 
D. Scope of Application and Coverage 
 
With respect to scope, the CRD IV/CRR regime can be strongly associated with the prudential 
regulation of banks. It applies to the entire population of EU ‘credit institutions’ - defined, 
broadly, as deposit-taking institutions.
25
 Some 8,000 credit institutions, from the very small to the 
EU’s Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs),26 come within the CRD IV/CRR regime, 
which covers some 52% of global banking assets.
27
 
The CRD IV/CRR regime also forms a key element of the EU’s investment firm prudential 
regulation regime. As was also the case with the earlier Basel II Agreement, the Basel III 
Agreement has been applied by the EU to all credit institutions and, in addition, to most 
investment firms.
28
 The extension of the Basel III Agreement by CRD IV/CRR to investment 
firms is designed to forestall the competitive distortions and arbitrage risks which could arise 
were it not so applied, particularly as EU regulation of credit institutions and investment firms 
applies on a functional basis and is not institution-based. Much of the regime is specific to credit 
institutions and to credit risk. But the CRD IV/CRR regime also imposes distinct rules on large 
universal banks with material capital market and trading operations and on specialist investment 
firms. These include requirements relating to the capital charge which applies to the ‘trading 
book’ (broadly, market activities) of financial institutions.  
With respect to the substantive coverage of the regime, CRD IV Article 1 provides that the 
Directive lays down rules concerning access to the activity of credit institutions and investment 
firms (access to the activity of investment firms will primarily be governed by MiFID II, however 
-  CRD IV contains the parallel authorization and passporting provisions for credit institutions); 
the supervisory powers and tools for the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms by NCAs; the prudential supervision of institutions by NCAs consistent with 
CRD IV/CRR; and the publication requirements for NCAs in the field of prudential regulation 
and supervision. Some elements of CRD IV are disapplied from investment firms given the 
parallel requirements for investment firms in MiFID II/MiFIR. 
                                                 
25
 Deﬁned as undertakings whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to 
grant credits for their own account: 2013 CRR Art. 4(1)(i). 
26
 For the current list see FSB, 2015 Update of the List of Global Systemically Important Banks. November 2015. 
27
 RCAP, n 20 above, 8. 
28
 2013 CRR Art. 4(1)(3). 
11 
The 2013 CRR addresses own funds (capital) requirements relating to credit risk, market risk, 
operational risk, and settlement risk; large exposure reporting and capital requirements; liquidity 
requirements; leverage reporting; and public disclosure requirements (CRR Article 1). Like CRD 
IV, while the CRR applies to credit institutions and investment firms, much of it is concerned 
with credit risk and accordingly with credit institutions. From the distinct investment firm 
perspective, the main features of the CRR include the capital requirements relating to risks other 
than core credit risk (and in particular counterparty credit, market, settlement, operational, and 
liquidity risk); the constituents of the own funds which can be used to meet capital requirements; 
and the disclosure reporting regime. 
 
E. CRD IV/CRR as One Moving Part within the Post Crisis Regulatory Framework 
 
The CRD IV/CRR regime forms only one element (if a key element) of the larger EU regulatory 
superstructure which is designed to support financial stability. For example, a regulatory 
dependence on capital requirements to manage financial institution risk would lead to a 
prohibitively costly capital regime which would likely trigger a contraction in the supply of 
credit. Accordingly, the regulatory superstructure of which the CRD IV/CRR regime forms a part 
includes the 2012 European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which addresses the 
stability of the derivatives market;
29
 the 2014 Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive 
(BRRD);
30
 the 2014 Deposit Guarantee Directive (DGD);
31
 and the proposed reforms to bank 
structure which are ongoing.
32
 All of these measures are designed to work together to address 
financial stability risk. The resolution and recovery procedures contained in the BRRD, for 
example, take some pressure from the CRD IV/CRR capital regime, while EMIR’s rules on the 
central clearing of derivatives work with those CRD IV/CRR capital rules which impose a capital 
charge on non-centrally cleared derivatives.  
 
                                                 
29
 Regulation EU (No) 648/2012 [2012] OJ L201/1. 
30
 Directive 2014/59/EU [2014] OJ L173/190. 
31
 Directive 2014/46/EU [2014] OJ L173/149. 
32
 The Commission Proposal is at COM (2014) 43. 
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II. Mapping CRD IV/CRR: the Main Elements 
 
A. Capital (Pillar 1) 
 
The CRD IV/CRR capital requirements are based on the Basel III Agreement. They accordingly 
seek to remedy the weaknesses in the Basel II capital assessment framework which became 
associated with the prejudicial prevalence of poor-quality capital (which was not sufficiently 
loss-absorbing) and of insufficient levels of capital which the crisis exposed. In response, a more 
prescriptive approach - which is designed to increase the quality and loss-absorption capacity of 
capital - has been adopted towards the constituents of capital (or own funds). Additional capital 
requirements have also been imposed, primarily through the capital buffers which are designed to 
mitigate pro-cyclicality risks. Higher capital requirements have also been imposed with respect to 
certain assets (notably investments in hedge funds, real estate, venture capital, and private 
equity). 
Among the most significant of the new capital requirements is the new capital charge for 
counterparty credit risk/Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA). This requirement is designed to 
capture ‘credit valuation adjustment risk’ -  or the risk associated with a deterioration in the 
creditworthiness of a counterparty (the risk of loss caused by changes in the credit spread of a 
counterparty due to changes in its credit quality
33
); such deterioration can have material systemic 
implications when related ratings downgrades and capital adjustments occur. As the financial 
crisis revealed, this risk is particularly acute with respect to OTC derivatives and with respect to 
repurchases and securities financing activities. The new CVA capital regime accordingly applies 
a capital charge to these instruments and activities and is designed to capture the mark-to-market 
losses associated with a deterioration in the creditworthiness of a counterparty and to provide 
incentives for financial institutions to reduce counterparty credit risk by clearing OTC derivatives 
through CCPs (although capital charges also apply to CCP exposures).
34
 The charge attempts in 
particular to manage risks arising from the difference between the hypothetical value of a 
derivative transaction, assuming a risk free counterparty, and the true value of a derivative 
transaction, taking into account the possibility of changes to the creditworthiness of 
                                                 
33
 Allen & Overy, Capital Requirements Directive IV Framework. Credit Valuation Adjustment. Allen & Overy 
Briefing Paper 10, January 2014. 
34
 Commission, 2011 CRD IV/CRR Proposal Impact Assessment (SEC (2011) 949) paras 3.4 and 5.3. 
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counterparty.
35
 The CVA risk assessment takes into account a range of risk mitigants such as 
collateral, netting, and hedging arrangements, and is designed to incentivize firms to enter into 
‘eligible hedges’ against counterparty risk (these hedges are defined under the CRR with 
reference to different eligible credit default swap (CDS) arrangements). 
The new capital requirements extend beyond the coverage of credit risk in the banking book and 
also cover trading book/market risk capital requirements. The related reforms include a new 
capital requirement for ‘stressed Value-At-Risk’ calculations (designed to ensure higher levels of 
capital apply to the trading book and to reduce pro-cyclicality risks
36
); an incremental capital 
charge to cover default risk and credit risk migration (for example, the impact of ratings 
downgrades); and additional capital requirements for securitized products in the trading book. 
Further and more fundamental reforms to the capital requirements assessment of trading book 
assets will follow as the Basel Committee has recently adopted a new market risk framework. 
The new regime, adopted in January 2016, must be implemented within national regimes by 
January 2019 and reported under by banks by December 2019.
37
 Key features of the new 
framework (which is informally being described as forming part of a ‘Basel IV’ package of 
reforms
38
), which is designed to harmonize trading book requirements more fully and also to 
increase trading book capital requirements, include: a more consistent and harmonized approach 
globally to trading book capital requirements; revisions to the regulatory boundary between the 
trading book and the banking book and clearer specification of which positions lie in each book, 
in order to limit arbitrage; reforms to the internal risk modelling standards required of financial 
institutions in relation to trading book risk where they use such internal models to calculate 
capital requirements, including supervisory approval requirements; a new standardized approach 
for the assessment of trading book capital requirements which is more risk sensitive; and rules 
governing risk management. The new regime accordingly provides for a standardized approach 
for calculating capital requirements and for an internal-model-based approach, although the 
regime is regarded as being designed to encourage firms to adopt the new standardized approach 
                                                 
35
 Allen & Overy, n 33 above. 
36
  N 18 above.  
37
 The current framework is based on Basel 2.5 (n18). The reforms have been in gestation for some time. See, eg: 
Basel Committee, Fundamental Review of the Trading Book. A Revised Market Risk Framework (2013); Basel 
Committee, Fundamental Review of the Trading Book. Outstanding Issues (2014); and Basel Committee, 
Fundamental Review of the Trading Book – Interim Impact Analysis (2015). In January 2016, the Basel Committee 
unveiled its new market risk framework: Basel Committee, Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (2016). 
38
 Key regulators and policy makers decry the ‘Basel IV’ label, arguing that the current generation of reforms 
represent the implementation and finalization of reforms committed to over the financial crisis: Arnold, M and 
Binham, C, ‘Basel Committee Soften New Rules on Bank Capital’, Financial Times, 14 January 2016. 
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in preference to relying on internal risk models (reflecting changes currently being made to the 
Basel III Agreement which are similarly designed to reduce the importance of internal-model-
based approaches to the assessment of capital requirements, as noted ahead).
39
 Related 
‘transformational’ change is likely to be necessary for firms’ data and technology 
infrastructures.
40
 Overall, the new ‘Basel IV’ trading book regime, while lighter than the reforms 
originally proposed, is predicted to make trading activities more costly for banks when it comes 
into force in 2019.
41
 
Overall, CRD IV/CRR financial institutions must satisfy three own funds/capital requirements: a 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) capital ratio of 4.5 per cent; a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6 per cent;
 42
 
and a total capital ratio of 8 per cent. In each case, the capital ratio is a percentage of the ‘total 
risk exposure amount’ (CRR, Article 92(2)). The 8 per cent capital ratio is supplemented by the 
new capital buffers and also by any additional SREP capital requirement which may apply to 
individual institutions, following the SREP review process. The capital buffers are addressed by 
CRD IV Articles 128–42, which provide for the Basel III-required buffers as well as the EU-
specific buffers: the capital conservation buffer (Basel III)
43
; the counter-cyclical buffer (Basel 
III)
44
; the global systemic institution risk buffer (EU);
45
 the other systemic institutions buffer 
(EU);
46
 and the systemic risk buffer (EU).
47
 Additional capital requirements may be imposed on 
any in-scope institution under the Pillar 2 supervisory review SREP process which is carried out 
by national supervisors.
48
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 PwC, Ten Key Points from Basel’s Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, 19 January 2016. 
40
 Ernst & Young, Fundamental Review of the Trading Book. The revised market risk capital framework and its 
implications, January 2016. 
41
 Noonan, L, ‘Basel IV Spectre Looms for Battle-worn Bankers’ Financial Times, 14 March 2016. 
42
 The components of ‘CET 1’ and ‘Tier 1’ capital are specified, albeit that the regime allows for significant 
divergence in application. 
43
 This buffer (2.5 % of total exposures and composed of Common Equity Tier 1 capital components) sits above 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital and is designed to conserve capital: where an institution breaches the buffer (where 
the total ratio of Common Equity Tier 1 falls below 7% - 4.5% and 2.5%), progressively tougher restrictions are 
imposed on the institution to ensure capital is conserved. 
44
 This buffer is designed to counteract economic cycle effects by requiring banks to hold an additional capital 
amount (composed of Common Equity Tier 1 capital components) in good economic conditions. This capital can 
then be released when economic activity contracts. 
45
 Inserted by the European Parliament and designed to apply a capital surcharge to global systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs) (as identified by the FSB). 
46
 Designed to apply a surcharge to domestically important institutions as well as EU institutions. 
47
 Member States may apply this buffer to the financial sector or one or more subsets of the financial sector. 
48
 The 2014 EBA Guidelines on Common Procedures and Methodologies for the Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (EBA/GL/2014/13) (the 2014 EBA SREP Guidelines) impose a unified ‘ICAAP’ (Internal Capital Adequacy 
Assessment Process) scoring procedure which can, following the SREP assessment by the supervisor, lead to the 
imposition of additional overall capital requirements. 
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The ‘total risk exposure amount’ against which the different capital ratios are set is the sum of a 
series of capital/risk assessments, mainly directed to asset risk, which are governed by the CRR. 
These assessments relate to: the ‘risk-weighted exposure amounts’ (the ‘RWA’ assessment) for 
credit risk and dilution risk in respect of all the business activities of an institution, excluding 
risk-weighted exposure amounts from the trading book of the institution; the own funds 
requirements for the trading book of an institution (for position risk and also for large exposures 
which exceed the limits set by the CRR); the own funds requirements for foreign exchange risk, 
settlement risk, and commodities risk; the own funds requirements for the credit valuation 
adjustment (CVA) risk of OTC derivatives, other than credit derivatives recognized to reduce 
risk-weighted exposure amounts for credit risk; and the risk-weighted exposure amounts for 
counterparty risk arising from the trading book business of the institution for identified 
derivatives, including credit derivatives, repurchase transactions, securities or commodities 
lending or borrowing transactions based on securities or commodities, margin lending 
transactions based on securities or commodities, and long settlement transactions (Article 92(3)). 
 
The internal capital/risk assessment process deployed by financial institutions and which governs 
these different assessments is very similar to the assessment process which applied under the 
Basel II Agreement which allowed institutions to rely on internal risk models (Basel I, by 
contrast, adopted a standardized approach). The capital assessment for credit risk, for example 
(similar methods apply to other forms of risk), remains based on the three Basel II 
‘Standardized’, ‘Internal Risk Based’ (IRB), and ‘Advanced Internal Risk Based’ approaches for 
assessing the risk weightings of assets (the ‘RWA’ assessment) against which the capital 
assessment is made. The Standardized model is based on the identification of large ‘buckets’ of 
assets to which risk weightings are assigned by the Basel III/CRD IV/CRR standards. Generally, 
only small banks with under-developed risk-modelling capacities adopt the Standardized model, 
which adopts a blunt approach to the risk assessment of assets, being based on broad risk buckets. 
The IRB model, used by most banks apart from the most complex and sophisticated, is based on 
banks using internal models (based on the ‘Probability of Default’) to determine the risk 
weighting to be attached to different asset classes, and allows for a more calibrated approach 
(which may be less costly in capital terms) to be adopted. The Advanced IRB model is more 
sophisticated again and allows banks to calculate credit risk using an additional assessment of 
‘Loss given Default’. This approach allows a bank to further calibrate the capital required by 
16 
assessing the exact loss which arises once a loan has defaulted. Supervisory review of the internal 
risk models used to determine the risk weightings used is accordingly of critical importance to 
the new regime, and much of CRD IV is therefore concerned with the Pillar 2 SREP supervisory 
review process. The SREP has led to the supervisory review of internal models for assessing 
capital - particularly the models used for the risk-weighting of assets (or the RWA process) - 
become more intensive and intrusive. Significant changes are, however, likely to follow. The 
Basel Committee has recently identified significant variability across banks in how capital is 
assessed, and is moving towards a more standardized approach, based on standard and 
comparable risk metrics and on limiting the extent to which banks can rely on internal risk 
models. Changes are likely to include: a removal of the IRB option for certain exposures, where 
the IRB model parameters are regarded as not being sufficiently reliable; minimum requirements 
for IRB models, to ensure a minimum level of conservatism; and greater specification of 
parameter estimation practices to reduce variability in the RWA assessment under the IRB 
approach.
49
 This development can be regarded as something of a move back to the Basel I, 
Standardized, approach and as a move away from the Basel II/III reliance on banks’ internal risk 
models.  
 
B. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (Pillar 1) 
 
The new liquidity coverage ratio (CRR, Articles 411-428) was heavily contested over the Basel 
III negotiations and has not yet received global support and is to be phased in for the EU market.  
The liquidity coverage ratio is designed to ensure that institutions manage their cash flows and 
liquidity more effectively and can better predict liquidity requirements and respond to liquidity 
strains. It is particularly concerned with banks’ ability to manage deposit outflows in a stressed 
environment, and to match assets with long-term and more stable liabilities. It is composed of 
two elements: a Liquidity Coverage Requirement (LCR) (a buffer designed to support short-term 
(30-day) liquidity resilience); and a Net Stable Funding Requirement (NSFR) (designed to ensure 
an institution has an acceptable amount of stable funding over a one-year period). 
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 Key analyses include: Basel Committee, Revisions to the Standardized Approach for Credit Risk (2013); Basel 
Committee, Analysis of Risk Weighted Assets for Credit Risk in the Banking Book (2013); Basel Committee, 
Capital Floors: the design of a framework based on standardised approaches (2014); and Basel Committee, Reducing 
Variation in Credit Risk-Weighted Assets – Constraints on the Use of Internal Model Approaches (2016), 
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The LCR is designed to ensure that institutions (and particularly banks) have a buffer of ‘high 
quality liquid assets’ to cover the difference between the expected cash outflows and the expected 
cash inflows over a 30 day stressed period. It requires institutions to maintain an LCR providing 
at least full coverage of projected liquidity outflows minus projected liquidity inflows under 
stressed conditions. The LCR is to be phased in with institutions required to hold 60% of the 
LCR in 2015, 70% in 2016, 80% in 2017 and 100% in 2018. The nature of the LCR calculation is 
to be amplified by delegated administrative ‘level 2’ rules (CRR Article 460). A Commission 
2015 level 2 administrative rule sets out the requirements governing the assets which can be 
considered as ‘high quality liquid assets’ and how expected cash outflows and inflows are to be 
calculated
50
 Until the LCR is in force, firms must report on their liquid assets on a not less than 
monthly basis. 
The Commission is not obliged to propose a NSFR although the CRR imposes a reporting 
requirement for the NSFR and provides for preparatory and exploratory work.
51
 
 
C. The Leverage Ratio (Pillar 1) 
 
The leverage ratio is designed to restrict the build-up of excessive leverage and to provide a 
backstop against failure of the risk models on which credit risk assessments are made, and against 
related gaming by institutions. A new prudential regulation tool, it is still at an early stage of 
development. The CRR regime (Articles 429–30) is accordingly based on data collection (with 
respect to institutions’ internal leverage ratios) and assessment, and a binding proposal is 
expected by the end of 2016. 
The EU regime is accordingly currently primarily based on disclosure. In October 2014, the 
Commission adopted a level 2 administrative rule which requires firms to use the same methods 
to calculate, report, and disclose their leverage ratios.
52
 Investment firms which do not take on 
proprietary risk are exempt from the leverage ratio. 
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 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 2015/61 [2015] OJ L11/1. 
51
 The Commission is consulting on the NSFR, based on EBA’s preparatory work: Commission, Consultation Paper 
on Further Considerations for the Implementation of the NSFR in the EU (2016). 
52
 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/62 [2015] OJ L11/37. 
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D. Risk Governance (Pillar 1) 
 
The 2013 CRD IV/CRR regime contains extensive requirements related to internal risk-
management systems and procedures. For example, and in addition to the detailed CRR-specific 
procedures which relate to the capital assessment process, under the CRD IV framework for 
‘review processes’ firms must have in place sound, effective, and comprehensive strategies and 
processes to maintain, on an ongoing basis, the amounts, types, and distribution of internal capital 
that they consider adequate to cover the nature and level of the risks to which they are or might 
be exposed (Article 73). More generally, an overarching requirement prescribes that firms have 
robust governance arrangements; effective processes to manage, monitor, and report the risks 
they are or might be exposed to; adequate internal control mechanisms; and remuneration policies 
and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management (Article 
74(1)). These systems must be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale, and 
complexity of the risks inherent in the firm’s business model and activities. Specific requirements 
apply with respect to recovery and resolution plans (Article 74(4)). An array of requirements 
governs particular internal risk-management procedures and systems (Articles 77–87), ranging 
from rules addressing how own funds are to be calculated to rules governing specific forms of 
risk assessment. 
 
E. Firm Governance (Pillar 1) 
 
Among the many new or re-tooled regulatory devices which the financial crisis produced is 
regulatory oversight of internal firm governance
53
 and the related imposition of requirements 
relating to governance structures, the fitness and probity of management, and the allocation of 
responsibility to directors and senior management.
54
 Governance requirements have been used to 
enhance risk management; to provide regulatory incentives (including through the application of 
civil liability and other enforcement devices) for directors and senior management to engage in 
                                                 
53
 Governance requirements are not new to EU financial regulation, but hitherto have primarily been a function of the 
EU’s corporate governance regime for listed companies. See, eg, Moloney, N, Ferrarini, G and Ungureanu, MC, 
‘Executive Remuneration in Crisis’ 10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2010) 73. 
54
 See, eg, Cheffins, B, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial Crisis’ 16 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law (2015) 1 and Hopt, K, ‘Better Governance of Financial Institutions’ in Ferrarini, G, Hopt, K and 
Wymeersch, E (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision. A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP, 2013) 337. 
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prudent risk management;
55
 and to promote cultural change.
56
 Traditionally, governance 
requirements have been deployed to improve interest alignment between shareholders and 
management in the public company; the financial crisis led to governance requirements being re-
deployed to respond to the systemic risks posed by financial institutions and to align the interests 
of a wider set of stakeholders with those of management. 
Although the Basel III Agreement does not directly address firm governance,
57
 CRD IV/CRR 
imposes an extensive governance regime on in-scope institutions. Under CRD IV (Articles 88 
and 91), governance requirements apply to management body composition, responsibilities, and 
functioning and are designed to support senior management oversight of risk management and 
the embedding of a culture of prudent risk assessment. Experience in the corporate governance 
field suggests that mandatory governance requirements, and particularly harmonized 
requirements, should be deployed with a light touch, and allow firms the flexibility to adapt 
governance structures to their business models and operating environments.
58
 The CRD IV 
regime is, however, prescriptive in places,
59
 including with respect to the number of permitted 
cross-directorships. 
The governance regime also includes the highly contested executive remuneration rules (CRD 
IV, Articles 92-96). As has been extensively examined, the regulation of executive remuneration 
was, from an early stage of the crisis-era reform process internationally, identified as a means for 
embedding stronger risk management processes and incentives,
60
 although the extent to which 
disclosure, governance, and substantive design requirements should be imposed on executive 
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 In the UK, the design of financial-institution-specific governance requirements and of civil liability regimes and 
sanctions for bank directors and senior management who engage in excessive risk-taking has been extensively 
debated. See, eg, from the earlier stages of the crisis-era, The Walker Review, A Review of Corporate Governance in 
UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities (2009) and, in its latter stages, Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking, Changing Banking for Good (2013). 
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 See Kershaw, D and Awrey, D, ‘Towards a More Ethical Culture in Finance: Regulatory and Governance 
Strategies’ in Morris, N and Vines, D (eds), Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Finance (OUP, 2014) 277. 
57
 Although the Basel Committee has supported governance reform: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance (2010). A revised set of Principles was issued in July 2015 (Basel 
Committee, Consultative Document, Guidelines, Corporate Governance Principles for Banks (2015)). 
58
 See, eg, Enriques, L and Volpin, P, ‘Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe’ 21 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 117 and Hertig, G, ‘Ongoing Board Reforms: One Size Fits All and Regulatory Capture’) 21 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy (2005) 269. 
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 For critique see Enriques and Zetsche, n 3 above. 
60
 Internationally coordinated reform of remuneration practices was supported by the G20 and driven by the FSB 
which has engaged in frequent reviews of its Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (2009) and related 
Implementation Standards (2009). For a recent example see FSB, Fourth Progress Report on Compensation Practices 
(2015). 
20 
remuneration has been subject to intense contestation.
61
 The CRD IV requirements reflect the 
EU’s crisis-era concern to promote stronger risk management processes within financial 
institutions and to construct more effective risk management incentives for management. But 
they also reflect the febrile debate on perceived excesses in ‘bankers’ pay’ during the CRD 
IV/CRR negotiations and the strong concern of the European Parliament to impose limits on 
variable pay. The CRD IV executive remuneration regime is based on the extensive 2010 CRD 
III reforms which applied a series of principles to the design of executive remuneration -  the 
CRD IV negotiations led to the CRD III regime being extended, including by the highly 
contested ‘bonus cap’ and by the similarly contested disclosures required relating to employees 
earning in excess of €1 million. 
The extensive and prescriptive CRD IV executive remuneration regime, which has disclosure, 
governance, design, and supervisory review elements, applies to credit institutions and 
investment firms at group, parent company, and subsidiary level and - generating great industry 
hostility and concerns as to the competitive position of the EU - to these entities when established 
in offshore financial centres (Article 92(1)). At the core of the regime is the requirement that 
firms comply (in a manner and to the extent appropriate to their size, internal organization, and 
the nature, scope, and complexity of their activities) with the seven principles set out when 
establishing and applying remuneration policies for and to particular categories of staff, including 
senior management and ‘risk takers’62. Remuneration governance is also addressed: where a firm 
is significant in terms of its size and internal organization, and the nature, scope and complexity 
of its activities, it must establish a remuneration committee, responsible for remuneration 
decisions (Article 95). Detailed and restrictive requirements apply to the variable elements of 
remuneration (Article 94). These include: the highly contested ratio rule (bonus cap), which 
requires that the variable component of remuneration cannot exceed 100% of the fixed 
component of total remuneration for each individual;
63
 the requirement that at least 50% of 
variable remuneration take the form of shares or equivalent ownership interests;
64
 the 
requirement that a substantial portion and at least 40% of variable pay is deferred for not less than 
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 See, eg, Avgouleas and Cullen, n 3 above; Ferran, E, ‘New Regulation of Remuneration in the Financial Sector in 
the EU’ 9 European Company and Financial Law Review (2012) 1; and Bebchuk, L and Spamann, H, ‘Regulating 
Bankers’ Pay’ 98 Georgetown Law Journal (2010) 247. 
62
 The latter category is governed by a Regulatory Technical Standard (C(2014) 1332). 
63
 The cap can be raised to 200%, but a series of conditions apply, including with respect to NCA and shareholder 
approval: Art. 94(1)(g). 
64
 Including instruments which can be fully converted into Common Equity Tier I instruments: Art. 94(1)(l). 
21 
three to five years; and the direction that all variable remuneration be subject to claw-backs 
(repayment).
65
 Specific supervisory obligations apply in relation to remuneration. These include 
the benchmarking by national supervisory authorities of remuneration trends and practices, and 
their collection of data on the number of natural persons per institution that are remunerated €1 
million or more per financial year (Article 75(3)) and related aggregated reporting by EBA.
66
 
 
F. Disclosure (Pillar 3) 
 
An extensive public disclosure regime applies to in-scope institutions under the CRR (Articles 
435-51). These disclosures are to be made at least annually and in conjunction with the annual 
financial statements (Article 433). Additional disclosures are required where a firm has been 
permitted to deploy particular methodologies under CRD IV/CRR, including the IRB approach. 
But while the public reporting regime is extensive it is dwarfed by the massive supervisory 
reporting regime which is embedded across CRD IV/CRR. FINREP (financial reporting) 
addresses financial reporting for supervisory purposes and COREP (common reporting) 
addresses supervisory reporting relating to capital. Highly detailed EBA templates govern the 
reporting required of institutions under FINREP and COREP. 
 
G. Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) (Pillar 2) 
 
The supervision of CRD IV/CRR is the subject of a distinct, harmonized supervisory regime 
(based on Basel III, Pillar 2). This regime is based on intense NCA review of institutions’ CRD 
IV/CRR compliance and on NCAs requiring specific risk mitigation measures which are 
calibrated to individual institutions’ risk profiles and which include, where appropriate, 
additional capital and liquidity requirements. As such, CRD IV/CRR represents a significant shift 
from the previously rules-based intervention which characterized EU harmonization in this area. 
This shift has been intensified by the extensive operational 2014 EBA SREP Guidelines which 
govern the practical application by NCAs of the SREP. 
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 The criteria for ‘clawback’ must include where the staff member participated in or was responsible for conduct 
which resulted in significant losses to the institution or failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety: 
Art. 94(1)(n). 
66
 EBA publishes aggregate data on ‘high earners’ (over €1 million) on a pan-EU basis. 
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The new supervisory regime has two elements which operate on a broadly annual cycle. 
Institutions are first expected to review their capital needs (the internal ‘ICAAP’). This internal 
review is followed by the ‘SREP’, which is carried out by NCAs and designed to ensure that 
institutions have adequate arrangements, strategies, processes, and mechanisms, as well as capital 
and liquidity, to ensure sound management and coverage of their risks. The SREP is considered 
further below. 
Reflecting the central importance of supervision to CRD IV/CRR, the coverage of NCAs’ 
required powers is detailed and so stands in contrast to EU financial system regulation more 
generally. For example, NCAs must have the expertise, resources, operational capacity, powers, 
and independence necessary to carry out their functions in relation to prudential supervision and 
related investigatory and enforcement activities (CRD IV Article 4(4)). Similarly, the CRD 
IV/CRR regime is prescriptive with respect to NCA form, given that prudential supervisors may 
sit within institutional arrangements which generate conflicts of interest. In this regard, CRD IV 
Article 4(7) provides that supervision under CRD IV/CRR must be separate and independent 
from functions relating to resolution. Resolution authorities must, however, co-operate closely 
and consult with the NCAs with respect to bank resolution plans. 
The most striking element of the CRD IV/CRR supervisory regime relates to the distinct 
‘supervisory review’ process (SREP) which NCAs must engage in to review the arrangements, 
strategies, processes, and mechanisms implemented by firms to comply with CRD IV/CRR (CRD 
IV, Articles 97–110). The SREP process is in part designed to ensure that institution-specific 
prudential measures (such as additional capital or liquidity requirements) are imposed where 
necessary. It is, accordingly, an important safety valve for NCAs, given the otherwise 
prescriptive harmonization under the capital regime in particular (see further section III on 
flexibility under CRD IV/CRR). In-scope institutions may, however, face considerable 
uncertainty as a result in their operating environments. The SREP, which must take place at least 
annually and include stress testing, is designed to evaluate the risks to which the institution is or 
might be exposed, the systemic risks which the institution may pose, and the risks revealed by 
stress testing, and to cover all CRD IV/CRR requirements. The swingeing supervisory powers 
which NCAs must be able to wield under the SREP include powers to: require institutions to hold 
additional own funds; reinforce internal capital and governance systems; apply specific 
provisioning policies; require divestment of excessively risky activities; limit variable 
remuneration where such remuneration is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital 
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base; restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments; require more frequent reporting; and 
impose specific liquidity requirements (Article 104). The technical criteria for the SREP are 
specified in some detail by Article 98, which requires, inter alia, that the results of stress tests are 
considered, that exposure to and management of identified risks are examined, and that 
governance arrangements, corporate culture and values, and the ability of management body 
members to perform their duties are examined. The conduct of the SREP is subject to review by 
EBA: NCAs are to report to EBA so that EBA can support the development of SREP consistency 
(Article 107). EBA is also charged with conducting SREP peer reviews and with reporting to the 
European Parliament and Council on the degree of convergence achieved.  
 
III. Risks and Implications 
 
A. Potential Risks: Some Regulatory Design Examples 
 
Unintended effects are, not surprisingly, becoming associated with the vast crisis-era reform 
programme. These relate to, for example, the cumulative impact of the G20 reform programme 
on the availability of high-quality collateral globally; the contraction in bank lending; the tougher 
capital requirements for market making and related liquidity pressure in the markets for certain 
long-term assets; and the growth of the shadow banking sector -  to identify just a few.
67
 
Specific concerns as to the implications of the CRD IV/CRR regime have been frequently aired, 
reflecting the scale and novelty of the new regime. These concerns have extended from general 
concerns as to the optimal role which capital can play in the support of financial stability
68
 to 
more specific concerns related to the design of CRD IV/CRR. The new CVA capital charge, for 
example, has led to concerns that the charge is too closely linked to the CDS market (on which 
the ‘eligible hedges’ regime which mitigates the CVA charge depends)  - which can be volatile -  
and that the charge may accordingly lead to higher rather than lower levels of counterparty credit 
risk. Similarly, and to take another example, the LCR has generated concern that it may lead to 
pressure on the availability of high quality collateral, as the LCR requires financial institutions to 
hold highly liquid, unencumbered assets as a liquidity buffer. 
                                                 
67
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To take another example, the persistence of internal risk models within the CRD IV/CRR 
framework has generated some concerns. The Basel III/CRD IV/CRR regime reflects an 
international concern, at the time of the Basel III Agreement negotiations, to move banks away 
from Standardized models for assessing risk.
69
 CRD IV/CRR accordingly seeks greater risk 
sensitivity and so encourages the use of internal risk models for calculating own funds 
requirements (CRD IV Article 77(1)). But it follows that effective supervisory review of the 
internal models used by banks is of critical importance if the risks of model gaming, internal 
competence failures, and of over-reliance on credit ratings in the design of models are to be 
effectively managed. The CRD IV/CRR SREP process is, however, leading to the supervisory 
review of the internal models used for assessing capital becoming more intensive and intrusive: 
the ECB/SSM is currently engaging in a major review of IRB models, for example, which is 
predicted to take several years.
70
 Nonetheless, the embedding of internal risk assessment models 
within the CRD IV/CRR regime has led to concern in some quarters, particularly given the 
weaknesses which the financial crisis exposed in the ability of internal models to reliably capture 
risk.
71
 Major changes are in train, however. The ongoing ‘Basel IV’ package of reforms is 
designed to address the risks posed by internal models, as noted in section II.A above. 
 
B. Potential Risks: Emerging Empirical Evidence - An Institutional View 
 
The Basel III Agreement was, from the outset, subject to empirical assessment,
72
 and empirical 
evidence on the impact of the crisis-era reform programme on global banking markets is 
beginning to emerge.
73
 With respect to CRD IV/CRR, initial indications seem to augur well, at 
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least with respect to the impact of CRD IV/CRR on the stability of banks - although findings are 
inevitably highly preliminary. It is certainly the case that bank capital ratios are strengthening,
74
 
as has been confirmed by a range of studies and assessments, including the 2014 EU-wide stress 
tests and the related ECB/SSM asset quality review.
75
 But it is also the case that the credit supply 
has contracted and that SMEs in particular are facing funding challenges. The proportion of small 
bank loans as a proportion of total EU lending has dropped, reflecting de-leveraging pressures, 
reduced bank risk appetite, but also regulatory effects relating to increased capital charges.
76
 To 
take another example, the matrix of rules which apply to securitizations under CRD IV/CRR is 
associated with the dampening of the securitization market and the related reduction in funding 
capacity in the EU.
77
 
More data can be expected. The EU’s commitment to ex post review, well expressed by the 
myriad review clauses within CRD IV/CRR, augurs well for the development of a reasonably 
robust institutional data-set on the impact of CRD IV/CRR. In addition, EBA,
78
 the ESRB, and 
the ECB (within the SSM in particular) provide the EU with a strong technical capacity for 
monitoring the impact of the CRD IV/CRR regime. 
The Commission’s initial summer 2014 review of the reform programme generally79 is a very 
early review
80
 and covers a period over which CRD IV/CRR had just come into force. The 
Commission highlighted, however, the importance of CRD IV/CRR to the financial stability 
agenda and adopted a robust approach to its potential costs, underlining the wider societal and 
economic importance of the reforms. The Commission’s study suggested that the impact of 
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higher bank capital requirements and the 2014 BRRD together could lead to a 0.6-1.1% increase 
in GDP annually,
81
 and noted significant improvements in bank risk governance. 
A more cautious assessment emerged from EBA in its important February 2015 review which 
sought to provide a preliminary assessment of the potential impact of the banking reforms (CRD 
IV/CRR; the BRRD; EMIR; and the bank structural reforms).
82
 Its findings underline how the 
CRD IV/CRR regime is likely to impact on different financial institutions in different ways. EBA 
reported that while the new capital regime will improve banks’ solvency, it is also likely to lead 
to changes to business models (particularly given the increased capital charges on trading 
activities) and will lead to pressure on banks’ income sources and generate operational and 
implementation costs. With respect to the Leverage Ratio, EBA found that, as the ratio is not 
risk-weighted, it will impact more heavily on banks engaging in low margin and low-risk-
weighted activity but in high volumes, and so might induce banks to shift to riskier assets and, 
overall, lead to a shrinkage in lending capacity. EBA also suggested that the Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio is likely to lead to a drive to increase deposits and reduce reliance on short-term wholesale 
funding and to more pressure on high quality liquid assets. EBA warned that the reforms will 
likely have contradictory effects, but suggested that, overall (and including CRD IV/CRR), the 
reforms are likely to: reduce the level of investment banking; lead to better capitalized 
institutions and a modified bank funding mix (based on more deposits and less heavily reliant on 
short-term wholesale funding); lengthen the maturity of wholesale funding; reduce the loan to 
deposit ratio; reduce the size of banks; lead to a rise in funding and operational costs and to a 
lower return on equity; and drive a greater emphasis on internal governance. EBA has similarly 
predicted that retail lending will contract and that banks will be less profitable. That the CRD 
IV/CRR reforms are likely to limit lending is borne out by the EU’s current flagship policy 
agenda – Capital Markets Union (CMU). The CMU agenda is, in part, designed to foster 
alternative, non-bank sources of lending, to address a contraction in SME lending and the funding 
challenges faced by SMEs, and to weaken the EU’s current dependence on bank financing,83 and 
as such can be related to the impact of CRD IV/CRR. 
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C. Flexibility and Proportionality 
 
CRD IV/CRR may, accordingly, generate unintended effects and may reduce the ability of the 
EU financial system to fund growth. The CRD IV/CRR regime is, however, designed to meet a 
range of inter-locking objectives which have often complex inter-relations and it will be some 
time before its effects are clear. It is all the more difficult to critique its effects as CRD IV/CRR 
forms part of a wider system of EU financial governance. While CRD IV/CRR can, for example, 
be associated with a contraction in lending, the current CMU agenda is designed to better equip 
EU financial governance to support a wider range of non-bank funding channels and to reduce 
the current dependence on bank funding. 
Nonetheless, given the uncertainty as to its effects, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a degree 
of flexibility and proportionality in the application of CRD IV/CRR is warranted. It is also the 
case that national banking markets continue to vary very significantly across the EU and to 
require calibrated regulatory treatment. A careful balance needs to be struck, however, between 
the accommodation of an appropriate level of flexibility, on the one hand, and the need, on the 
other hand, to ensure pan-EU regulatory consistency so that arbitrage effects are minimized, pan-
EU consistency in supervisory practices, and, for the Banking Union zone, that the SSM, in 
applying CRD IV/CRR, is operating within a legally clear environment. 
The following sections consider whether CRD IV/CRR and its supporting regulatory and 
supervisory governance arrangements balance appropriately between flexibility and consistency 
by examining the harmonization model employed by CRD IV/CRR; the institutional capacity of 
the EU to calibrate and finesse CRD IV/CRR; and the supervisory governance arrangements 
which underpin CRD IV/CRR. 
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IV. Mitigating Risks: Flexibility and the Single Rule-book 
 
A. The Single Rule-book and CRD IV/CRR: A Dense Rule-book? 
 
CRD IV/CRR is designed to operate as a ‘single rule-book’ which applies consistently across the 
Member States. As such, it reflects the EU’s wider policy goal, since the financial crisis, to 
construct a ‘single rule-book’ for the EU financial system.84 
An intense level of harmonization is achieved by CRD IV/CRR. Over 100 BTSs - proposed by 
EBA and adopted by the Commission - are to amplify CRD IV/CRR, along with other level 2 
delegated administrative rules proposed and adopted by the Commission and, in addition, soft 
EBA Guidelines and Recommendations. To take the own funds/capital example, the CRR sets 
out the characteristics and conditions for the constituents of own funds, and a series of mandates 
have been given to EBA to produce draft BTSs on the quality criteria which apply to own funds, 
the deductions to be applied to own funds, and the related disclosure requirements. In addition, 
EBA monitors the quality of own funds and may provide related advice and opinions. The own 
funds matrix therefore currently includes detailed BTSs on own funds, which address the 
constituent components of capital and deductions from capital;
85
 EBA reports which monitor the 
quality of own funds;
86
 and EBA lists which identify the capital instruments that have been 
classified by NCAs as Core Equity Tier 1 capital.
87
 To take another example - the supervision 
example -  EBA has adopted extensive Guidelines for common procedures and methodologies for 
the SREP
88
 which are regarded by EBA as a ‘major step forward in forging a consistent 
supervisory culture across the single market.’ Overall, the degree of prescription which the CRD 
IV/CRR brings is well-illustrated by the interactive ‘single rule-book’ hosted by EBA which 
embeds the extensive range of BTSs, other delegated administrative rules, and soft Guidelines 
and Recommendations within the CRD IV/CRR legislative text. 
The intense level of harmonization adopted under CRD IV/CRR and the related commitment to a 
single rule-book reflects a number of factors. These include the wider political commitment to a 
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single rule-book over the financial crisis; the granular nature of prudential regulation and the 
intensity of the Basel III Agreement reforms; and the crisis-era experience with the more open-
textured 2006 CRD I regime. The EU’s major diagnostic report on the financial crisis, the de 
Larosière Report, found, for example, that Member States took different approaches to the core 
definition of the own funds which constituted capital, to internal firm governance, and to ‘fit and 
proper’ management rules.89 In addition, a number of Member States did not apply (as was 
permitted under a transitional opt-out) certain 2006 CRD I rules which might have reduced the 
risks of securitization activities, and significant divergences appeared with respect to Member 
States’ requirements for the IRB risk models on which the Basel II/CRD I capital regime heavily 
depended.
90
 The ‘single rule-book’ approach was accordingly designed to remove national 
options and discretions and, thereby, to remove inconsistencies and the related risks of 
regulatory/supervisory arbitrage, competitive distortions, and damage to the internal market. 
 
B. A Porous Rule-book? 
 
But, although typically described as constituting a single rule-book, it is not clear that the CRD 
IV/CRR prudential regime operates as one. With respect to the capital rules, for example, some 
flexibility is built into the regime. Additional capital (and leverage and liquidity requirements) 
can be imposed by NCAs on individual institutions under the SREP process (CRD IV, Article 
104). NCAs are additionally empowered to increase the capital requirements which apply in 
relation to real estate loan assets in order to manage local property bubbles (CRR, Article 124) 
and, more generally, NCAs can impose additional and stricter requirements where they identify 
changes in the intensity of macro-prudential or systemic risk in the financial system with the 
potential to have serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy in a 
specific Member State (CRR, Article 458). The capital buffer regime is also designed to allow 
NCAs some flexibility, particularly with respect to the Counter-cyclical Buffer which Member 
States are to adjust to reflect local economic and structural conditions. Similarly, the Systemic 
Risk Buffer is designed to apply flexibly, including with respect to whether it applies to one 
institution, a subset of institutions, or all institutions. Initial evidence from the ESRB suggests 
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that Member States and their NCAs are applying these macro-prudential measures and capital 
buffers to reflect national market conditions.
91
 
More generally, an array of national exemptions and discretions are available. These include a 
host of technical options and discretions on the technicalities of how capital is constituted; on the 
application of the CVA charge (for example, whether the CVA calculation applies to securities 
financing transactions and if related risk exposures are ‘material); on the application of the large 
exposure regime (under which NCAs can exempt certain intra-group exposures
92
); and on the 
application of the LCR to investment firms, pending Commission action in this area. Elsewhere, 
core concepts are not subject to detailed or prescriptive definitions. Perhaps most prominently, 
the pivotal definition of the instruments eligible for Core Equity Tier 1 capital is designed in 
terms of the instruments meeting a range of criteria which reflect the Basel III Agreement (CRR, 
Article 26).
93
 
The CRD IV/CRR prudential rule-book can also be characterized as being somewhat porous with 
respect to its implementation of the Basel III Agreement. In a number of respects, CRD IV/CRR 
deviates from the Basel III Agreement. The major deviations include additions to the Basel III 
regime, notably the rules which apply to corporate governance (including executive 
remuneration) and to systems and controls; the additional capital buffers which apply in the EU; 
and the enhanced Pillar 3 disclosures relating to risk management objectives and policies, 
governance arrangements, and leverage ratios. The additions also include the highly detailed 
reporting requirements which apply to supervisory capital reporting (COREP) and financial 
reporting (FINREP), and which are the subject of detailed rules governing formats and templates. 
The deviations from the Basel III Agreement also take the form of alterations to the Basel III 
regime; these include the series of exemptions which apply to the CVA capital regime as well as 
the lighter capital charge which applies in the EU to SME loan assets (noted below). 
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C. Does Divergence Matter or Mitigate? 
 
A reasonable argument can be made to the effect that the flexibility within CRD IV/CRR and the 
changes it makes to the Basel III Agreement are strengths.  
CRD IV/CRR applies to a vast and diverse population of credit institutions and investments firms 
and applies across Member States with different economic cycles and conditions and which are 
experiencing different stages of financial system development.
94
 A fully harmonized regime, 
which does not reflect EU-specific conditions, could accordingly be prejudicial. The novel LCR, 
for example, is expressly designed to take into account the large and diverse population of EU 
banks.
95
 
In addition, the national supervisory flexibility which the SREP accommodates injects a degree 
of pragmatism into CRD IV/CRR and reflects the need for some local supervisory discretion. 
Similarly, the ability of NCAs to impose additional prudential requirements (with respect to 
capital, risk weights, large exposures, and liquidity) in order to address macro-
prudential/systemic risk (CRR, Article 458) acts as a mitigant against over-prescription and 
insufficient flexibility in the regime (as well as against regulatory error) and may come to operate  
as a useful safety valve. The potential for disruption to the internal market and for competitive 
gaming by Member States is reduced by the novel procedural controls which apply to Article 
458. These include the possibility for a Council veto (on a Commission proposal) where there is 
‘robust, strong, and detailed evidence’ that the national measure will have a negative impact on 
the internal market that outweighs the financial stability benefits. The ESRB has reported 
positively on the procedure.
96
 
The flexibility within the regime also provides a means through which political risks and 
pressures can be addressed. Over the CRD IV/CRR negotiations the appropriateness of the shift 
to a single rule-book approach was contested between the Member States. With respect to capital 
levels, for example, the general prohibition on Member States from adopting additional capital 
requirements (outside the specific provisions which allow for local supervisory action) was 
highly contested over the negotiations with some Member States, notably the UK and Sweden, 
concerned to retain the flexibility to impose additional capital requirements where necessary 
given local market conditions. The highly prescriptive executive remuneration regime also 
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proved highly contentious in the UK which took an unsuccessful action to the Court of Justice of 
the EU which it ultimately abandoned following the Advocate General’s November 2014 
dismissal of its claim.
97
 The flexible capital buffer regime, however, has proved to be a useful 
means for addressing at least some of these potentially destructive political pressures and 
tensions and for accommodating national preferences. For example, the UK’s approach to bank 
structural reform, which involves imposing a higher capital charge on some institutions, is 
regarded as being accommodated within the Systemic Risk Buffer which can be used for a subset 
of institutions (in this case, the banks within the UK ‘ringfence’). Devices such as these 
accordingly provide a means through which the EU can support some local flexibility on 
regulatory design questions which require sensitivity to local economic and political conditions. 
Similar arguments can be made with respect to the CRD IV/CRR divergences from the Basel III 
Agreement. CRD IV/CRR diverges from the Basel III Agreement with respect to, for example, 
the capital charge for SME loan assets. Under CRD IV/CRR, the Basel III capital requirement is, 
in effect, reduced by a factor of 0.7619 (the SME capital discount or ‘supporting factor’). This 
discount was identified by the Basel Committee as a material divergence from the Basel III 
Agreement.
98
 But the EU has long been concerned to strengthen the weak EU SME funding 
market and has recently made strenuous regulatory efforts in this regard, including revisions to 
prospectus disclosures; the construction of a new ‘SME Growth Market’ regulatory classification 
for trading venues; and under the CMU agenda, which contains a number of reforms directed to 
SME funding. Reflecting this policy concern, in its 2016 Report for the Commission on the EU 
SME capital discount EBA highlighted that the discount was designed as a precautionary 
measure against the risk of lending to SMEs being jeopardized in the wake of the stricter Basel 
II/CRD IV/CRR capital requirements, and so had a non-prudential function -  although EBA also 
reported that the initial evidence suggested that the discount had not provided an additional 
stimulus for lending to SMEs and called for additional monitoring of the effects of the discount.
99
 
This variation through the discount of the Basel III requirements accordingly reflects a long-
standing weakness in the EU economy and a related policy concern to support SMEs.
100
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There are, however, countervailing factors which suggest that the porous nature of the CRD 
IV/CRR rule-book may generate - rather than mitigate - regulatory risks. With respect to the 
internal market, transaction costs for cross-border banking groups could be generated as well as 
distortions to competition and regulatory arbitrage risks, all of which could be prejudicial for the 
stability and efficiency of the internal market. EBA Chairman Enria has warned of the risks 
which exemptions, derogations, and mechanisms for allowing national flexibility bring and has 
identified the Basel Committee implementation review process (noted below) as a corrective 
mechanism.
101
 Particular concerns have recently emerged with respect to national divergences in 
relation to the instruments which can constitute capital – the differential treatment of deferred tax 
assets is a significant source of difference across the Member States.
102
 With specific reference to 
Banking Union, the ECB/SSM’s important 2013-2014 Comprehensive Assessment of the balance 
sheets of the 130 most significant banks in the Euro Area found variations in the current 
definition of capital across banks and Member States which, it suggested, undermined the extent 
to which any review could provide a reliable pan-Euro-Area picture of bank health. It warned of 
the need to improve the consistency of the capital definition and of the related quality of Core 
Equity Tier 1 capital which it identified as a priority matter for the SSM.
103
 Further challenges 
arise for Banking Union. Relevant national rules implementing EU banking rules must be applied 
by the ECB within the SSM where the harmonized rules take the form of a Directive (2013 
SSM/ECB Regulation, Article 4(3)). Difficulties may arise therefore where Member States have, 
for example, ‘gold-plated’ CRD IV/CRR, adopted distinct national arrangements, or where the 
correct interpretation is not clear. For example, which court (Court of Justice or national) has 
jurisdiction to rule on a contested ECB application/interpretation within the SSM of a relevant 
national law implementing CRD IV?
104
 While these procedural complexities can be addressed, 
they underline nonetheless the importance of minimizing unnecessary divergence in the single 
rule-book. The ECB/SSM has already taken action for the Banking Union zone, adopting a 2016 
Regulation which governs how it will exercise the different national options and discretion 
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conferred on NCAs and which it may, as the SSM supervisor, apply; these include certain options 
and discretions relating to the definition of capital.
105
 More generally, the Commission has 
committed to reducing national options and discretions.
106
  
From a global perspective, EU divergences from the Basel III Agreement risk the creation of 
competitive distortions internationally. The EU’s approach to the new CVA capital charge 
relating to derivative transactions is particularly problematic in this regard. The EU has adopted a 
series of exemptions to the CVA charge which are not available under the Basel III Agreement. 
Many relate to how EMIR (which imposes central clearing requirements on certain derivatives 
transactions as well as risk management requirements more generally) is designed. The EU CVA 
exemptions under CRD IV/CRR include the dis-application of the CVA charge from transactions 
with ‘non financial counterparties’ whose derivatives activities fall under the threshold at which 
EMIR applies to derivatives transactions; with pension funds (reflecting an EMIR transitional 
exemption); and with entities which fall outside the scope of EMIR (including central banks, 
development banks, and local/regional governments). These exemptions could lead to a 
significant competitive advantage for EU banks and investment firms in the pricing of derivatives 
trades with counterparties as exempted transactions will not be subject to a CVA charge. The EU 
accordingly failed the Basel Committee’s 2014 review of EU implementation of Basel III (under 
the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme - RCAP) with respect to the CVA capital 
charge. The Basel Committee found that the exemptions were a material departure from Basel III 
and materially boosted the capital ratios of EU institutions.
107
 The Basel Committee also pointed 
to the EU’s concessionary risk weights for SMEs as an ‘important departure from the letter and 
spirit of Basel.’108 Overall, while much of the CRD IV/CRR regime was in compliance with 
Basel III, these departures (and other elements) led to a finding of ‘material non compliance’ 
against the EU. 
The impact of these divergences internationally remains to be seen. There are, however, some 
grounds for cautioning against predictions of serious prejudice to the Basel III Agreement. Full 
global convergence under Basel III is unlikely to be achieved given the different national 
preferences at stake and the extent to which international standards are changed as they are 
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filtered through national implementation processes.
109
 The Basel III Agreement is also still in a 
transitional stage and is continually being refreshed, in part to reflect market experience with the 
regime.
110
 EU divergences may accordingly come to represent a means through which the EU 
‘uploads’ its interests to ongoing Basel Committee negotiations,111 while the Basel Committee 
RCAP monitoring mechanism provides a means through which pressure can be exerted on the 
EU to, at the least, review those divergences which reflect distinct EU economic interests and 
which are prejudicial internationally. 
 
V. Mitigating Risks: Rule Design and Rule-Making 
 
A. The Legislative Text 
 
Does the CRD IV/CRR regime contain within it textual mitigants against regulatory risk, distinct 
from the approach to harmonization noted in section IV above? It is certainly the case that the 
CRD IV/CRR regime is potentially highly dynamic. It seems reasonable to predict, as discussed 
in section V.B, that EBA has the technical capacity to drive change to the regime at the 
administrative level. But the review clauses - a major feature of the crisis-era regulatory regime - 
embedded within CRD IV/CRR also provide a means for correcting and refreshing the regime at 
the legislative level, if there is the political will to engage with change. 
To take only one example, Article 502 CRR requires the Commission (in consultation with EBA, 
the ESRB, and the Member States) to periodically monitor whether CRD IV/CRR has had 
significant effects on the economic cycle and to consider whether any related remedial measures 
are justified. This review obligation is accompanied by a host of more specific review obligations 
(Articles 502-519), some of which have a wide reach (for example the obligation to assess the 
impact of the regime on long-term funding) and some of which are more specific (such as the 
review obligations which apply to the CVA). 
In addition, phase-in techniques are deployed across CRD IV/CRR, which does not come fully 
into force until 2019. The LCR and Leverage Ratio are phased in, for example, but so too are 
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different elements of the capital regime. Observations periods and reporting periods are similarly 
a feature of the LCR and Leverage Ratio regimes. 
The CRD IV/CRR regime also relies to a significant extent on proportionality devices which give 
both in-scope firms and NCAs some discretion in how the regime is applied and which allow the 
regime to be calibrated to reflect the wide and diverse population of financial institutions subject 
to CRD IV/CRR. These devices apply to both substantive rules and to supervisory requirements. 
With respect to the timing of the SREP, for example, NCAs are to establish the frequency and 
terms of the SREP review, having regard to the size, systemic importance, nature, scale, and 
complexity of the activities of the institution concerned, and taking into account the principle of 
proportionality (CRD IV, Article 97). Proportionality is also a particular feature of the new 
internal governance regime. The governance arrangements, risk management systems, internal 
control procedures, and remuneration policies to promote sound and effective risk management 
required under Article 74 CRD IV, for example, must be proportionate to the nature, scale, and 
complexity of the risks inherent in the institution’s business model and activities. To take another 
example from the governance sphere, a nomination committee is only required for those 
institutions which are significant in terms of size, internal organization, and the nature, scope, and 
complexity of their activities (Article 88(2)). With respect to the capital rules, the extent to which 
institutions must use the more sensitive (and complex) IRB approach (as called for by the Basel 
III Agreement but now under review) similarly depends on the type of institution engaged. 
Article 77(1) of CRD IV requires NCAs to encourage institutions that are significant in terms of 
their size and internal organization, and the nature, scale, and complexity of their activities, to 
develop an internal credit risk assessment capacity and to increase their use of the CRR’s IRB 
approach for calculating own-funds requirements for credit risk, where their exposures are 
material in absolute terms and where they have, at the same time, a large amount of material 
counterparties. Proportionality mechanisms are currently the focus of close policy and 
institutional attention in the EU given their importance for the appropriate calibration of rules to 
national conditions and to particular business models.
112
 They carry, however, the risk of 
divergence and of gaming and can lead to rules being disapplied altogether. The particular 
difficulties which the CRD IV/CRR executive remuneration regime has generated with respect to 
proportionality are considered in the following section. 
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B. The Rule-making Process and EBA 
 
The scale of the CRD IV/CRR delegations to administrative ‘level 2’ rule-making, and 
particularly to BTSs proposed by EBA, suggests that the related injection of EBA’s technical 
expertise, and the extensive consultation procedures to which EBA is subject, can mitigate the 
risks of CRD IV/CRR regulatory error. Consideration of EBA’s role in the amplification and 
(potentially) correction of the regime is therefore warranted. 
As has been widely discussed and debated, including over the 2014 Commission ESFS 
Review,
113
 the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) bring enhanced technical capacity and 
transparency to delegated ‘level 2’ administrative rule-making. This is notwithstanding persistent 
challenges relating to the accountability, funding, and independence of the ESAs – and in 
particular relating to the influence exerted by the Commission over BTSs, as these are proposed 
by the ESAs but adopted by the Commission.
114
 ESMA, the sister ‘markets’ authority to EBA 
was the pathfinder for the quasi-rule-making powers conferred on the ESAs. EBA was somewhat 
later to engage with the level 2 process given the 2013 adoption of CRD IV/CRR but has since 
been engaged in a massive quasi-regulatory exercise, proposing a vast number of BTSs for 
adoption by the Commission, producing Technical Advice for the Commission for administrative 
rules not in the form of BTSs, and adopting soft Guidelines and Recommendations. From the 
publicly available documentation, the process seems relatively smooth, with little public evidence 
of de-stabilizing tensions between the Commission (the constitutional location of ‘level 2’ rule-
making power and which adopts BTSs) and EBA (the location of technical expertise and a focal 
point for industry consultation, but which can only propose BTSs). There are, however, stresses 
in the process. 
The vast bulk of the delegations to administrative rule-making under CRD IV/CRR concern the 
proposal by EBA of BTSs. These delegations relate accordingly to the BTS ‘level 2’ process 
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which was adopted under the founding 2010 ESA Regulations
115
 and not to the standard ‘level 2’ 
process under which the Commission proposes and adopts administrative rules (reflecting the 
Article 290 and 291 TFEU process) and in respect of which EBA’s role is limited to providing 
Technical Advice.  
The EBA/Commission relationship with respect to BTSs seems to be functioning well, certainly 
based on the large number of BTSs which have been proposed and adopted. Points of difference 
can, however, arise between the Commission and EBA, notwithstanding EBA’s technical 
expertise and the extensive consultation it engages in. Sometimes these points of difference are 
made public. For example, in its FAQ on the LCR (and with respect to EBA’s Technical Advice) 
the Commission noted differences with EBA’s Advice ‘on a small number of points’ and that 
‘this is not to be construed as a negative reflection on the quality or rigour of EBA work.’116 But 
more typically it can be difficult to discern why and where the Commission changes EBA’s 
approach and the process through which changes are made (which can involve lobbying of the 
Commission) is not transparent. One major report on the ESA Review, for example, highlighted 
industry concern that BTSs proposals from EBA were being over-turned later in the BTS 
process.
117
 A solution to this difficulty is not easily found as the Commission is the constitutional 
location of delegated, administrative rule-making power. Overall, however, the scale of the BTSs 
produced since the adoption of CRD IV/CRR is a testament to the overall effectiveness of the 
process. 
Other challenges arise. It is not clear, for example, that the procedurally cumbersome BTS 
process, which is based on a series of steps and on Commission endorsement of the BTS, is 
appropriate for some of the highly technical operational standards which EBA proposes. In 
particular, one BTS sets out the technical reporting template to be used by banks for supervisory 
reporting and is composed in part of a series of data cells. Notoriously, it runs to some 1,861 
pages in the Official Journal.
118
 Changes to this template are inevitably required as glitches arise 
in the template, technical changes are made to particular reporting lines, and other highly 
technical and detailed amendments are made. But the BTS process requires that all of these 
technical changes, however procedural, must go through the BTS process and OJ publication. 
While efforts are underway to develop an efficient procedural means for addressing such 
                                                 
115
 Eg, EBA Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 OJ [2010] L331/12, Arts. 10-14. 
116
 N 95 above. 
117
 Mazars Report, n 114 above, para 63. 
118
 The BTS relates to supervisory reporting ([2014] OJ L191/1). 
39 
technical issues,
119
 the difficulties underline the challenges which the current process can 
generate. 
Difficulties with timeliness have also arisen, leading to potential legal uncertainty for market 
participants and to a lack of clarity for NCAs in the application of CRD IV/CRR. Strict time 
limits (typically 3 months) apply to the Commission when considering a BTS proposal from 
EBA. But over the CRD IV/CRR process, these periods have, on occasion, been very 
significantly extended.
120
 While such delays, in effect, breach the EBA Regulation which sets out 
the time limits for Commission review of proposed BTSs, action is unlikely. But delays of this 
nature can bring costs for market participants. 
The binding rule-book aside, EBA’s soft law tools, and in particular its Guidelines, provide the 
EU with an additional means for supporting the consistency with which CRD IV/CRR is applied 
and for addressing difficulties which emerge. To take one example, in response to the criticism 
by the Basel Committee of the EU for allowing the application of Standardized risk weights to 
certain exposures where a bank is otherwise to apply the IRB approach, the EU noted the role of 
EBA in supporting convergence and, in particular, the mandate to EBA to adopt Guidelines 
setting out recommended limits on the proportion of a bank balance sheet which is subject to the 
Standardized approach (CRR Article 150(4)). The EU also noted the importance of EBA’s 
Guidelines and other advisory work in driving convergence with respect to the constituents of 
Core Equity Tier I capital.
121
 More generally, EBA’s 2014 SREP Guidelines are of critical 
importance to supporting convergence in how NCAs across the EU apply their Pillar 2 
supervisory powers, given the significant risk of divergence in operational procedures. The Basel 
Committee has acknowledged more generally the importance of EBA Guidelines in supporting 
the consistent application of rules, albeit that it has also highlighted that this remains a ‘work in 
progress.’122 
EBA Guidelines also provide a mechanism for signalling where changes may be necessary to the 
legislative regime. The scope of application of the proportionality mechanism which applies to 
the CRD IV/CRR remuneration regime (under Articles 74 and 92(2) CRD IV and Article 450 
CRR) proved contentious within EBA, with some NCAs suggesting that it can mean the dis-
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application of certain remuneration requirements to particular firms, notably smaller and complex 
firms.
123
 EBA’s 2015 Guidelines on the remuneration regime124 adopt the position, reflecting the 
Commission’s view, that the proportionality requirement, as currently drafted in the level 1 text, 
cannot lead to the dis-application/waiver of remuneration requirements. EBA has, however, 
recognized that waivers are, in some circumstances, appropriate and has, in a separate Opinion, 
called for legal clarification of CRD IV.
125
  EBA has also recommended that legislative action be 
taken to address the EU’s failure to comply with the Basel III CVA regime and advised NCAs on 
the appropriate steps to take, including under the SREP, pending such legislative change.
126
  
Whether or not EBA’s initiatives in support of greater consistency tilt CRD IV/CRR away from 
an optimal balance between consistency and flexibility remains to be seen. But it can be 
suggested with a reasonable degree of confidence that EBA brings an expert, technocratic 
capacity to bear - even allowing for the reality that the NCAs on its decision-making Board of 
Supervisors are likely to bring national preferences into play -  and that EBA is sensitive to the 
political context. For example, while EBA was notably robust in expressing concern as to the 
materiality of the risks which arose because of the EU CVA exemptions, it was careful to be 
sensitive to the impossibility of changing the regime other than through legislative change by the 
co-legislators.  
Overall, EBA has significantly enhanced the institutional and technical capacity of the EU. But 
EBA operates within an increasingly challenging and dynamic operating environment following 
the establishment of the ECB/SSM. How it manages the challenges which may emerge, such as 
Banking Union caucusing on its Board of Supervisors or the ECB/SSM operating as a competing 
standard-setter,
127
 will have wider implications for the EU’s capacity to manage risks arising 
from CRD IV/CRR. 
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VI. Mitigating Risks: Supervising CRD IV/CRR 
 
A. EBA and CRD IV/CRR Supervision 
 
Among the most innovative features of CRD IV/CRR is the degree of prescription it imposes on 
supervision, in particular with respect to the SREP. This new supervisory regime may mitigate 
the risks posed by CRD IV/CRR but it may also increase the risks. 
The supervisory governance arrangements which support the supervision of CRD IV/CRR and 
the SREP sit within a complex institutional architecture. The defining feature of this architecture 
is the structural fault which divides the EU’s supervisory governance arrangements governing the 
single banking market (primarily EBA’s remit) from those governing Banking Union/the SSM 
(primarily the remit of the ECB). EBA, operating under the supervisory coordination 
arrangements which apply under CRD IV/CRR and which include requirements for cross-border 
colleges of supervisors,
128
 is charged with driving pan-EU supervisory convergence in how CRD 
IV/CRR is applied, in particular under the SREP, and with supporting related pan-EU 
supervisory coordination. The ECB, at the centre of the SSM, is responsible for oversight of the 
SSM and for the direct supervision of some 123 banking groups in accordance with CRD 
IV/CRR and also with EBA’s pan-EU convergence measures, including its SREP Guidelines. 
From its establishment EBA has been mandated to support supervisory convergence and 
coordination across the single banking market and it has been conferred with a series of related 
powers, including with respect to participation in and oversight of colleges of supervisors; peer 
review; and the adoption of supervisory guidance.
129
 Specific supervisory convergence 
obligations are also imposed on EBA under CRD IV/CRR. In particular, Article 107 CRD IV 
mandates EBA to collect and assess supervisory information from NCAs, including with respect 
to the SREP, stress testing, and internal model review; adopt SREP guidelines; conduct peer 
reviews; and report annually to the European Parliament and Council on the degree of 
supervisory convergence across the Member States. 
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The demands of the CRD IV/CRR regulatory agenda have been such that it is only recently that 
EBA’s supervisory mandate has come to the fore and that its potential to support pan-EU 
supervisory convergence has become clearer. Chief among its initiatives are the important and 
detailed 2014 SREP Guidelines which govern the granular business of CRD IV/CRR supervision 
and which are built on: business model analysis; assessment of internal governance and control 
arrangements; assessment of risks to capital and capital adequacy; and assessment of risks to 
liquidity and liquidity adequacy.
130
 But while the Guidelines are designed to ensure that 
institutions with similar risk profiles, business models, and geographic exposures are reviewed 
and assessed by NCAs consistently, and are subject to broadly consistent supervisory 
expectations, their aim is ‘not to impose restrictive granular SREP procedures and 
methodologies.’131 EBA has emphasized that the Guidelines are ‘guiding’ and should not be 
regarded as ‘restricting or limiting supervisory judgment as long as it is line with applicable 
legislation’, but that the intended harmonization and convergence should not be compromised.132 
The SREP is also designed to apply proportionately, reflecting the level of systemic risk posed by 
an institution, and to support a ‘minimum engagement model’ where the frequency, depth, and 
intensity of assessments varies according to the category of institution.
133
 
The line between the degree of pan-EU supervisory consistency necessary to support financial 
stability and the avoidance of arbitrage and local preference and forbearance, and the prejudicial 
dampening of appropriate national supervisory discretion, is thin. But the SREP Guidelines at 
least acknowledge the need for local flexibility, albeit within an EBA-set framework. While CRD 
IV/CRR is still a very new regime, and while the SREP Guidelines came into force only in 2016, 
early indications augur well, including for EBA’s ability to support convergence. EBA’s 2015 
report, for example noted that since 2011 a ‘satisfactory degree of convergence’ had taken place 
in the overall supervisory framework, although divergent supervisory methodologies still 
persisted.
134
 
The achievement of optimal supervisory outcomes is further supported by EBA’s review of the 
colleges of supervisors which are charged with applying the SREP in a coordinated manner. EBA 
is required under CRD IV to participate in and monitor the EU’s colleges of supervisors (there 
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are currently some 102 active colleges) (CRD IV, Article 116).
 135
 In fulfilling this mandate EBA 
engages in thematic review of colleges, following some 25 ‘closely monitored’ colleges 
intensely. EBA’s review, which seems to be robust, serves to identify weaknesses, to identify 
areas where progress is needed, and to set objectives. In its 2014 review, for example, EBA 
reported that the process for reaching joint decisions on capital was becoming more standardized 
and better structured, but that more consistency was needed in the outcomes of the joint decisions 
made by the EU’s supervisory colleges.136 In its 2015 review, it noted further progress, 
particularly with respect to group risk assessments, although it noted that joint decision-making 
in relation to capital and liquidity sill posed challenges,
137
  
The arrangements which support CRD IV/CRR supervision have yet to be tested under pressure, 
but they hold the promise of leading to greater consistency and effectiveness in supervision. They 
also, certainly at this point, accommodate national supervisory judgment. The potential efficacy 
of these arrangements must, however, be considered in the context of the forces which Banking 
Union may unleash, to potentially destructive effect. 
 
B. The Impact of Banking Union 
 
This discussion will not canvass the reasons for and the governance arrangements of Banking 
Union’s SSM.138 But from the perspective of optimal CRD IV/CRR supervision, the co-existence 
alongside EBA, charged with supporting pan-EU supervisory convergence and coordination, of 
the ECB/SSM - the direct supervisor of 123 of the EU’s most significant banking groups and 
responsible for the delivery of SSM-scope supervision of all SSM-scope banks - may destabilize 
the institutional setting of CRD IV/CRR supervision. This risk is well reflected in the vivid 
acknowledgement by EBA Chairman Enria of the ‘existential search’ which EBA faces in the 
supervisory area.
139
 Supervision appears to be the major fault-line across ECB/EBA relations - 
and the CRD IV/CRR SREP runs along this fault-line. 
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The ECB within the SSM, as a supervisor, is subject to the CRD IV/CRR SREP requirements and 
to EBA’s SREP Guidelines and related supervisory convergence and coordination measures, 
including with respect to the application of CRD IV/CRR within colleges of supervisors.
140
 But 
supervision is a granular operational activity, and divergences may arise between how the ECB 
delivers supervision within the SSM and EBA’s pan-EU Guidelines and other measures in this 
area. More specifically, the ‘SSM Supervisory Manual’, developed by the ECB in consultation 
with SSM NCAs and under continual review, covers the processes, procedures, and 
methodologies for the supervision of all SSM banks: the Manual covers the ‘SSM SREP’, 
including with respect to risk assessment and bank capital and liquidity quantification.
141
 It 
remains to be seen whether divergences will develop between EBA’s approach to the SREP and 
the SSM’s approach, and whether any divergences become material with prejudicial 
consequences for the integrity of CRD IV/CRR supervision. There are already multiple indicators 
of the ECB’s intention to adopt a harmonized approach to supervision. It is, for example, 
engaging in a review of banks’ IRB models for capital assessment and, more generally, in its first 
Annual Report, informed bank management of its determination to ‘carry out the necessary 
changes to achieve full harmonization in order to create a level playing field and more effective 
supervision.’142 
Pessimistic speculation as to destructive SSM/EBA tensions may, however, risk over-statement. 
EBA is not configured as a direct supervisor and its concern is convergence, not supervision; it 
has a distinct role to that of the ECB/SSM. In addition, early indications suggest a cooperative 
relationship between the ECB/SSM and EBA. The important 2014 pan-EU asset quality 
review/stress test, for example, which was, in effect, shared between the ECB and EBA was, 
institutionally at least, successful in terms of ECB and EBA cooperation and despite the strong 
incentives both institutions (both of which have powers in relation to stress testing
143
) had to 
claim ownership over the exercise. Similarly, EBA has agreed on an approach for the 2016 stress 
test, which will be carried out in coordination with the ECB for the Banking Union zone. 
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Overall, what can be concluded as to the impact current supervisory governance arrangements are 
likely to have on the EU’s capacity to achieve a balance between ensuring that CRD IV/CRR 
applies consistently across the EU, and allowing for a degree of fluidity and national flexibility? 
It is difficult to argue that EBA will not bring greater consistency to CRD IV/CRR application 
and supervision in light of recent evidence. It also seems to be the case that national supervisory 
judgment will be accommodated, particularly with respect to the discretions which NCAs have 
under the SREP and with respect to the application of macro-prudential tools, including the 
different capital buffers. Within the Banking Union zone, a higher degree of prescription can be 
expected, particularly for the 123 significant banking groups which fall under direct ECB 
supervision – although even here, the Joint Supervisory Teams (composed of ECB and NCA 
staff) which supervise these groups are to respond to the diversity of bank business models across 
the EU and are designed to reflect the specific knowledge of local NCAs.
144
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This discussion considers the background to and major features of the behemoth CRD IV/CRR 
regime which governs the prudential regulation and supervision of banks and investment firms in 
the EU. While the CRD IV/CRR regime is still in its infancy, initial empirical assessments point 
to a likely strengthening of bank stability but to a contraction in the funding capacity of the EU 
financial system consequent on its application. While the outcome of CRD IV/CRR remains 
unclear, it can reasonably be speculated that, along with a strengthening of financial stability, it 
may have unintended and prejudicial effects, not least given the concerns raised during its 
negotiation on aspects of its regulatory design. The extent to which CRD IV/CRR can be applied 
flexibly, amplified and corrected reasonably easily, and supervised in manner which supports 
consistency of application across the EU along with an appropriate level of national supervisory 
discretion, will shape the ability of the EU to mitigate the risk of these effects arising. 
CRD IV/CRR harmonizes at an intense level. But there is a significant degree of flexibility 
within the regime. It is unclear whether this flexibility will, in the long term, act as a risk mitigant 
or exacerbate the dangers of prejudicial effects. But until the CRD IV/CRR regime matures, the 
discretions and options contained within it, and which reflect the persistent structural differences 
across the EU banking market, provide an important safety valve for the application of national 
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discretion. CRD IV/CRR also contains a number of textual mitigants which should reduce the 
risk of unintended effects, notably the proportionality mechanisms which allow for calibrated 
application of the regime. The EU’s regulatory capacity to amplify and correct CRD IV/CRR is 
in large part a function of EBA’s effectiveness and recent evidence augurs well in this regard. 
While difficulties persist with respect to the effectiveness of the administrative rule-making 
procedures which govern much of EBA’s quasi-regulatory activities, EBA’s technical capacity to 
shape and correct CRD IV/CRR is considerable. 
The extent to which the EU’s supervisory governance arrangements will lead to an optimal 
balance between consistency and flexibility can only be speculated on, particularly as the effect 
of the SSM remains to be seen. But it can reasonably be asserted that while EBA is likely to drive 
greater consistency in supervisory practices, NCAs are unlikely to be significantly constrained in 
exercising supervisory judgment which is informed by local experience. 
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